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Brinkley: Military Judges, One Appointment or Two: Weiss v. United States

NOTES AND COMMENTS
MILITARY JUDGES, ONE APPOINTMENT OR
TWO: WEISS v. UNITED STATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The system of checks and balances created by the framers of the
United States Constitution symbolizes a recognition of the inherent
power struggles that plague any form of government. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution is one device the framers designed to
thwart the usurpation of power by one branch of government from
another.' From a mechanical standpoint, the Appointments Clause
provides the sole method for appointing "Officers of the United
States." 2 It gives the President power to appoint principal officers
with the advice and consent of the Senate and vests appointment
power over inferior officers in the President, Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments without Senate approval? In its broadest
sense, the Appointments Clause addresses the separation of powers
1. Justice Souter in his concurring opinion wrote:
While it is true that 'the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist
Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches,' (cite omitted) the Framers also expressed concern over the threat of expanding presidential
power, including specifically in the context of appointments. (cite omitted) Indeed, the
Framers added language to both halves of the Appointments Clause specifically to address the concern that the President might attempt unilaterally to create and fill federal
offices. (cite omitted) No doubt, Article I's assignment to Congress of the power to
make laws makes the Legislative Branch the most likely candidate for encroaching on
the power of the others. But Article II gives the President means of his own to encroach, and indeed we have been forced to invalidate presidential attempts to usurp
legislative authority, as the Buckley Court recognized: 'The Court has held that the
President may not execute and exercise legislative authority belonging to Congress.'
(cite omitted).
Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 766 n.2 (1994).
2. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minsters and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 5

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:157

permeating our system of government. It does so by limiting the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint from which Congress can choose. By so doing, Congress is prevented from dispensing
appointment power too freely or keeping it for itself.4 By thwarting
the danger of Congress aggrandizing its power at the expense of the
Executive Branch, the Appointments Clause limitations help preserve
the structural integrity of our government as envisioned in the
Constitution.5
This seemingly simplistic clause leaves much to be interpreted.
For instance, courts have struggled with the task of classifying officers
as either principal officers or inferior officers.6 There is also controversy over those circumstances that produce the need for appointment, such as when Congress vests an existing office with new
responsibilities.7 In such a case, it is sometimes debatable whether the
incumbent officeholder's new responsibilities require him or her to be
duly appointed a second time as if being appointed to a new office.
This is the debate concerning certain military judges.
All military trial judges and most military appellate judges are
also commissioned military officers. 8 Commissioned military officers
are considered "inferior" officers of the United States and are duly
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. 9 Those military judges who are also commissioned military officers are not appointed to their positions; instead, they are "detailed" to their
positions by their commanding officer. 10 Because the position of military judge has evolved into one with responsibilities much like those
of civilian judges, critics of the modem military justice system contend
that appointment of these positions should be made in accordance

4. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991).
5. See id. at 878.
6. This debate is outside the scope of this paper because it has no bearing on the outcome
of the Weiss decision, however Justice Souter believed that the case would raise a more difficult
constitutional question if it involved the appointment of principal officers. Weiss v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 766 (1994).
7. See, eg., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
8. Appellate judges may be commissioned officers or civilians. Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1988) [hereinafter U.C.M.J.]. The Court of Military Appeals consists of
five civilian judges who are duly appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Arts. 67,142 U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. §§ 867,942 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The appointment
of these judges are not at issue in the Weiss case.
9. United States v. Weiss, 36 MJ. 224,227 (C.M.A. 1992).
10. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 760.
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with the Appointments Clause. 1 Others argue that the initial appointment of a military judge as a commissioned military officer is
enough to comply with the requirements of the Appointments
Clause.12 The Supreme Court of the United States recently settled
this issue in Weiss v. United States." This note examines whether the
current method of appointing military judges violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts
Two marines, Eric Weiss and Ernesto Hernandez, pled guilty
before courts-martial 14 in separate proceedings to separate crimes. A
special 5 court-martial convicted Weiss of one count of larceny for violating Article 121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(U.C.M.J.). 16 Weiss was sentenced to three months of confinement,
partial forfeiture of pay, and a bad-conduct discharge.' 7 Hernandez
was convicted by a general' 8 court-martial of possession, importation,
and distribution of cocaine. Hernandez was sentenced to 25 years of
confinement, forfeiture of all pay, a reduction in rank, and a dishonorable discharge.' 9
In separate appeals, the Court of Military Review affirmed the
petitioners' convictions. The Court of Military Appeals agreed to
consider Weiss's contention that the judge in his case lacked the authority to convict him because the judge was not duly appointed in
accordance with the Appointments Clause. 2° In a plurality opinion,
11. Brief of Petitiondrs on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals
(October Term 1992)(on file with author).

12. See United States v. Weiss, 36 MJ. 224 (C.M.A. 1992) (majority opinion).
13. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
14. A court-martial is a temporary court, called into existence by a military order and dis-

solved when its purpose is accomplished. See Arts. 22-24 U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1988).
15. A special court-martial usually consists of a military judge and three court-martial members. Art. 16(2) U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (1988). A special court-martial has jurisdiction
over most offenses under the U.C.MJ., but it may impose punishment no greater than six
months of confinement, three months of hard labor without confinement, a bad conduct discharge, partial and temporary forfeiture of pay, and a reduction in rank. 10 U.S.C. § 819.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).

17. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 755 (1994).
18. A general court-martial consists of either a military judge and at least five members, or
the judge alone if the defendant so requests. Art. 16(1), U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 816(1) (1988). A

general court-martial has jurisdiction over all offenses under the U.C.M.J. and may impose any
lawful sentence. 10 U.S.C. § 818.
19. Hernandez's sentence was reduced to 20 years of confinement by the convening officer.
Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 755.
20. United States v. Weiss, 36 Mi. 224, 225 (C.M.A. 1992).
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three of the five judges on the Court of Military Appeals concluded
that the present system of appointing military judges was adequate.
The three concurring judges relied on two largely inconsistent rationales to garner a majority. 'No of the judges agreed that military
judges are officers who must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, but believed their initial appointment as commissioned officers adequately satisfied the Appointments Clause.21 The
third judge concurred in the result only, concluding that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the military.22 TWo judges dissented,
opining that the duties of military judges are sufficiently distinct from
the other duties performed by military officers to require a second
appointmentP3
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner Weiss. 24 Based on that decision, the Court of Military Appeals
also affirmed the conviction of petitioner Hernandez.25 Weiss and
Hernandez jointly petitioned for Supreme Court review, and the
Court granted certiorari 26
B. Issue
Weiss and Hernandez were primarily concerned with the ability
of the military judges who heard their cases to issue autonomous decisions, without influence from the judges' superiors. Judge Advocate
Generals (J.A.G.) are the senior uniformed lawyers in each branch of
the service except the Coast Guard. They command all military
legal officers, including those serving as military judges, and are responsible for the supervision of all military justice matters. 8 The
J.A.G. has virtually unreviewable discretion to remove or transfer military judges. All military judges, excluding judges on the Military
Court of Appeals, are selected and appointed by their service's
21. See id. at 225-34.
22. See id. at 234-40.
23. See id. at 240-63.
24. See id. at 224.
25. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 755 (1994).
26. The focus of this note is on the Appointments Clause issue. In Weiss, the Court also had
to decide whether the lack of a fixed term for military trial judges and for judges sitting on the
Court of Military Review violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court decided that it did not. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 760-63.
27. In the Coast Guard the position is held by the General Counsel of the Department of
Transportation.
28. Art. 6(a) U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 806(a) (1988).
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J.A.G. 2 9 Trial judges and judges serving on the Court of Military Review serve at the discretion of the J.A.G. and have no fixed terms of

office. 30 Moreover, the J.A.G. prepares annual fitness reports regarding these judges, which are used to decide promotions, duty assign-

ments, and susceptibility to involuntary early retirement.3 1 The
petitioners argued that decisions of military judges lack adequate assurances of sovereignty; thus, any decision could be tainted by the
preferences of the J.A.G.32
Weiss and Hernandez believed the system of appointing military
judges provided inadequate assurances of protection from impartial
decision makers. One of the ways they addressed this concern was by
attacking the current method of detailing duly appointed military officers to the position of military judges without requiring a separate
appointment. That procedure, they contended, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In Weiss v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court settled the issue. 33 This note is concerned with
the appropriateness of the Court's conclusion and the analysis used in
reaching the conclusion.
Ill.

DEcISION OF THE CASE

The Supreme Court 34 affirmed the convictions of Weiss and Hernandez, holding that the current method of appointing military judges
does not violate the Appointments Clause.35 The majority agreed that
since military judges are appointed, pursuant to the Appointments
29. The Court of Military Appeals has five judges appointed from civilian life by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for fixed terms of fifteen years. Art. 142
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 942 (Supp. IV 1988). Petitioners do not contest the validity of appointment regarding these judges.
30. The fact that these judges have no fixed term of office was a second issue presented by
the petitioners and reviewed by the Supreme Court. Petitioners argued that the Due Process
Clause requires that military judges must have a fixed term of office. The Supreme Court found
that neither history nor current practice supported petitioner's claim that a military judge who
does not have a fixed term lacks the independence necessary to ensure impartiality, thus, the
lack of a fixed term of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
5th Amendment. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 760-63.
31. See Art. 6, U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 806 (1988).
32. Brief of Petitioners on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals
(October term 1992)(on file with author).
33. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
34. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, and in which Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined in part. Justices Souter and Ginsburg filed separate concurring opinions, and
Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas
joined. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 754.
35. Id. at 760.
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Clause, as officers, there is no need for a second appointment when
they are assigned to serve as judges.36 The rationalization for this conclusion focused on the duties of military judges as compared to the
duties of other military officers. The Court found the position of military judge was not so dissimilar to other positions to which a military
officer might be detailed, that a second appointment was needed. The
Court went on to contend that neither Congress, by implication, nor
the Appointments Clause, by its own force, required a second appointment before an officer could discharge judicial duties.37
Though concurring in the conclusion, the Justices disagreed on
the analysis used to reach it. Shoemaker v. United States,38 a landmark
case, recognized that when a duly appointed officer undertakes new
duties, the officer can do so without the necessity of a new appointment if the new duties are "germane" to the existing duties of that
officer.3 9 Despite the Court's recognition of Shoemaker, the majority
chose to distinguish Weiss from Shoemaker, holding a "germaneness"
analysis was unnecessary to their conclusion.40
However, in dictum, the court did say that even if the "germaneness" analysis were applied, no second appointment would be required because the role of the military judge is "germane" to that of
the military officer.41 Concurring in the conclusion, Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas questioned the majority's decision not to apply a "germaneness" analysis. 42 The Justices argued that a "germaneness" analysis must be conducted whenever it is necessary to assure that the
conferring of new duties does not violate the Appointments Clause.43
IV. DOES

THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE REQUIRE A SEPARATE
APPOINTMENT FOR MILITARY JUDGES?

Virtually all "officers"' 4 of the United States are to be appointed
in accordance with the Appointments Clause, and no type is excluded
36. See id. at 757.
37. Id. at 760.
38. 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
39. Id.; see, eg., United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224, 228 (C.M.A. 1992).
40. Weiss v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 752, 759 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 770.
43. Id.
44. The determination of whether a party is an officer also involves a second step of determining whether they are "principal" or "inferior" officers. The majority in Weiss v. United States
decided that like ordinary commissioned military officers, military judges are inferior officers
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Though such a distinction would not seem to
have any bearing on the outcome of the case, Justice Souter believed that to classify military
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because of its special function. 45 It is almost beyond controversy that
military judges are "officers" as contemplated by the Appointments
Clause. In Buckley v. Valeo, 4 the Supreme Court defined the term
"officer" as "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States."47
Military Judges exercise significant authority and, therefore, qualify as officers. A court-martial can try any offense committed by a
member of the armed services regardless of when or where it took
place or who the victim was; the sole requirement is that the accused
was on active military duty at the time of the offense.' 8 The military
trial judge rules on all legal questions and instructs court-martial
members regarding the law and procedures to be followed.4 9 Military
trial judges can decide guilt or innocence and impose sentences.50
Most significantly, since 1968,-' with the consent of the accused, military trial judges can sit without a court-martial panel52 and try a case
as would a district judge. Military judges on the Court of Military
Review review all cases in which the sentence imposed exceeds one
year of confinement, involves dismissal of a commissioned officer, or
involves the punitive discharge of an enlisted service member.53 This
appellate court can review de novo both factual and legal findings, 54
and it may overturn convictions and sentences. 55 As officers of the
United States, military judges must be appointed in accordance with
the Appointments Clause.
A. No Additional Judicial Appointment of Military Judges is
Necessary Because Their OriginalAppointment as Military
Officers Satisfies the Appointments Clause
The relevant controversy does not center on whether a military
judge must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
judges as principal officers would raise a "far more difficult constitutional question" because of
the greater potential for aggrandizement and abdication. Weiss, 114 S.Ct. at 763-69 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
45. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
46. Id.at 126.
47. Id.
48. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1987).
49. Art. 51, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 851 (1988).
50. Id.
51. In 1968 Congress revised the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Military Justice Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
52. See Art. 16(1)(B), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 816(1)(B) (1988).
53. Art. 66(B), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(B) (1988).
54. United States v. Cole, 31 MJ. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990).

55. Art. 66(c)-(d), U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 866(c)-(d) (1988).
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Clause. Few would disagree that since military judges exercise significant authority they must be properly appointed. 6 The problem is that
military judges are not specifically appointed as such. Rather, military
officers with legal expertise are "detailed" to specific courts-martial by
their J.A.G. 5 7 Nevertheless, all military trial judges and most appellate military judges are commissioned officers of their respective service.5 8 Commissioned officers of the armed forces are officers of the
United States,5 9 and are duly appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the initial
appointment as a military officer suffices when that officer is assigned
"judicial" duties or whether a new judicial appointment is necessary
for military officers to constitutionally carry out judicial duties.
The Supreme Court correctly concluded that Congress did not
specifically or by implication require a separate appointment.6 Where
Congress has seen fit to require separate appointments for certain military officers in the past, it has done so expressly. The Supreme Court
recognized that Congress expressly requires separate appointment by
the President and confirmation by the Senate for a number of top
level positions in the military hierarchy.61 Congress has distinguished
56. In her concurring opinion, Judge Crawford argued that the Appointments Clause did
not apply to the selection of military judges. She argued that at the time of the Constitutional
Convention there was no thought given to how the Appointments Clause should be applied to
the military trial and appellate judges. Further, she contended that subjecting appointment of
military judges to the Appointments Clause did not serve the interest to be protected by the
Appointments Clause. Finally, she argued that the unique nature of the military and its offices
render the Appointments Clause inapplicable. United States v. Weiss, 36 MJ. 224, 234-40
(C.M.A. 1992).
57. Art. 26(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (1988).
58. Appellate judges may be commissioned officers or civilians. Art. 66(a), U.C.MJ., 10
U.S.C. § 866(a) (1988).
59. See Wood v. United States, 107 U.S. 414, 417 (1883).
60. Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 752 (1994). The intentions of Congress are of
importance because "judicial deferene ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their
governance is challenged." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,508 (1986)(quoting Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,70 (1981)). The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress' extraordinary powers to regulate the military. See United States v. Prive, 35 M.J. 569, 573 (C.G.C.M.R.
1992)(citing and discussing Supreme Court cases which recognize extraordinary judicial deference granted to Congress' decisions concerning regulation of the military). This deference is
premised on the fact that the military is unique in nature. It is a specialized society separate
from civilian society whose mission requires that individual rights must yield to overriding military necessity. Id. at 574-75.
61. Additional appointment and Senate confirmation is required for the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 U.S.C. §§ 152, 154 (1988); the Chief and Vice Chief of
Naval Operations, 10 U.S.C. §§ 5033, 5035; the Commandant and Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps, 10 U.S.C. §§ 5043, 5044; the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
10 U.S.C. §§ 3036, 5137, 8036; the Chief of Naval Personnel, 10 U.S.C. § 5141; the Chief of
Chaplains, 10 U.S.C. § 5142; and the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, 10 U.S.C. §§ 3037, 5148, 8037.
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between an office requiring a separate appointment, and a position or
duty to which one can be assigned or detailed by a superior officer.
For instance, the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff for the Army
are considered "general officers detailed to those positions."'6 2 Moreover, the sections of the U.C.M.J. concerning military judges expressly
provide for "detailing" and "assignment" of military judges with no
mention of a separate appointment.63
B.

"Germaneness" Test

Even though Congress may not require a special appointment,
the Appointments Clause may demand a separate appointment by its
own force. The Constitution dictates that when Congress creates an
office, the officer must be appointed according to the demands of the
Appointments Clause. 64 The same is not true where Congress merely
increases the power and duties of an existing office, provided the new
powers and duties are "germane" to the existing powers and duties. 65
The landmark case creating the "germaneness" exception to the
Appointments Clause is Shoemaker v. United States.66 Whether the
duties of a military judge are germane to the duties of a military officer is a factual issue. The Shoemaker test examines whether the
duty in question can fairly be said to be dissimilar to or outside the
sphere of official duties. 67 If so, then the duties are not germane to
the official duties. In relevant part, Shoemaker concerned the enactment of a federal statute establishing a commission to supervise the
development of Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia. Three
of the commissioners were appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, but two others were not similarly appointed. These two men were the Chief of Engineers of the Army and
the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia, both of
62. 10 U.S.C. § 3035 (1988)(emphasis added). Other examples include: the Chief of Staff
of the Marine Corps and his assistants who are "detailed" to those positions by the Secretary of
the Navy. 10 U.S.C. § 5045. Commissioned officers may be detailed for duty with the American
Red Cross by the appropriate military Secretary. 10 U.S.C. § 711a; Secretaries of military departments may assign or detail members of the armed forces to be inspectors of buildings owned or
occupied abroad by the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 713; the Secretary of the Navy may assign
enlisted members of the Navy to serve as custodians of foreign embassies and consulates. 10
U.S.C. § 5983; and the President may detail officers of the Navy to serve as superintendents or
instructors at Nautical Schools. 10 U.S.C. § 5985.
63. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (1988)(providing that a military judge shall be detailed to
each general court martial, and may be detailed to any special court martial).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
65. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 301.
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68
which were already appointed as commissioned military officers.
Respondents contended that the Appointments Clause required reappointment of the two officers to their new positions since Congress

had created a new office.6 9

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that because
these two men were duly appointed officers of the United States when
the Rock Creek Park Act was passed, and because the additional duties were not dissimilar to or outside the sphere of the official duties
already held by the officers, it was not necessary that they be appointed again by the President and confirmed by the Senate.70 This
ruling confirmed that Congress could increase the power and duties of
an existing office without thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent be nominated and appointed a second time.
In Weiss, the majority mistakenly declined to apply a "germaneness" analysis.71 Instead, the court distinguished the present case
from Shoemaker.72 The court held that the cases differ based on the
passage of the 1968 Military Justice Act (M.J.A.). 73 Pursuant to the
M.J.A., military judges could be selected from "hundreds or perhaps
thousands of qualified commissioned officers."' 74 The Weiss court

found that the present case lacked the concern which was the basis of
the Shoemaker decision-that Congress was trying to both create an
office and also select a particular individual to fill the office in violation of the Appointments Clause.75
As Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas pointed out in their concurring opinion, although the cases are distinguishable, the justification
for the Shoemaker decision does not warrant abandonment of the
"germaneness" analysis. 76 The majority failed to consider the full impact of a germaneness analysis. Though germaneness as an exception
provides for a more loose interpretation of the Appointments Clause,
it also provides limitations. When Congress increases the powers and
duties of an existing office, such action does not make it necessary that
68. Id. at 284.

69.
70.
71.
in part

Id. at 300.
Id. at 300-01.
Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752,770 (1994)(Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring
and concurring in the judgment).

72. Id.

73. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
74. Weiss, 114 S.Ct. at 759.
75. Id.

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
and Thomas, J.,
76. Id. at 770 (Scalia, J.,
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the incumbent be again nominated and appointed. 77 The germaneness analysis helps assure that Congress does not circumvent the Appointments Clause by simply professing to increase the powers and
duties of an existing office when in fact creating an office with an entirely new function. The concern in Shoemaker was that Congress was
effectively appropriating to itself the appointment power over the two
previously appointed commissioners.78 The germaneness analysis was
essential in determining whether such was the case.
Violation of the Appointments Clause may also occur when Congress, without aggrandizing itself, effectively lodges appointment
power in someone other than the President, heads of departments, or
courts of law. 79 This was the concern in Weiss. Pursuant to the M.J.A.,
J.A.G.s appoint military judges.8 " However, J.A.G.s do not fit into any
of the three categories allowed by the Appointments Clause. Thus, if
military judges, acting pursuant to the M.J.A., exercise duties non-germane to serving as a military officer, the appointment power vested in
J.A.G.s violates the Appointments Clause.
C. Did Congress Create a New Office?
In the past, a position was considered an "office" only when Congress required that the position be filled by the President, heads of
departments, or a court of law.8 ' Such an approach does not conform
with the accepted notion that Congress cannot legislate in violation of
the Appointments Clause. 2 Today, the Supreme Court looks at the
functions and duties of a purported office to determine whether an
office of the United States has been created.83 This is important in
determining whether an existing office has had its powers and duties
increased, or whether an entirely new office has been created. Petitioners and respondents in Weiss sharply disagreed over the characterization of the functions and duties of military judges.8 4
77. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1893).
78. Id.
79. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 765-66 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1988).
81. United States v. Weiss, 36 Mi. 224, 259 n.5 (C.M.A. 1992).
82. Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
84. The petitioners seem to argue that the functions and duties of military judges are new
and separate from their functions as commissioned military officers, even legally trained military
officers. Respondents argue that the duties of a military judge are similar to those of a military
officer because of the role all military officers play in military justice, and because the military
justice functions were performed by military officers until 1968. Respondents apparently view
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A historical examination shows that as the position of military
judge evolved, the military judge acquired the functions and duties
previously performed by other military officers. In 1920, the Articles
of War (A.W.) were amended to require that a "law member" be detailed to general courts-martial in the Army."5 The U.C.M.J. was
amended in 1950 to require a detail of a "law officer" to every general
court-martial. 86 In 1968, the U.C.M.J. was again amended, redesignating the law officer as military judge.87 With each amendment, the emphasis remained on placing legal matters in the hands of legally
trained officers.88 The 1968 Amendment changed the title of the law
officer to military judge, not to create a new office but to increase the
stature of, and to transfer more legal duties to the military judge.8 9 It
seems clear that Congress transferred legal authority and duties from
one military officer to another and renamed the law officer in an effort
to put legal matters under the purview of legally trained officers.
There appears to have been no intent to create an entirely new office.
Duties that were historically those of military officers remained the
duties of military officers.
A different analysis is warranted when considering whether officers sitting on the Courts of Military Review need a second appointment. When Congress created Boards of Review, the predecessor to
the Courts of Military Review, 90 they created a new office. The Court
of Military Appeals has ruled that Courts of Military Review are unmistakably Courts created by Congress. 91 Before amended in 1968,
the U.C.M.J. mandated that the J.A.G. of each of the armed forces
constitute in his office one or more Boards of Review.92 Effective in
1968, the U.C.M.J. was revised to read:
the position of military judge as only a name change and not a significant change in responsibility. See generally Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994).
85. 41 Stat. 787, 788 (1920).
86. Art. 26, U.C.M.J., 50 U.S.C. § 590 (repealed 1956).
87. Art. 26, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1988).
88. For instance, prior to the 1920 amendments to the Articles of War, the president of a
court martial, who usually was not a lawyer, presided over the trial. See para. 89, Manual for
Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1917. More recently, the Military Justice Act of 1968 for example,
required military judges to preside over special courts martial, and authorized an accused to
request trial by a court martial composed of only a military judge. Pub. L. No. 90-632, § 2(9), 82
Stat. 1335, 1336.
89. See Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
90. In 1968, the U.C.M.J. was amended to change the name of the boards of review to
Courts of Military Review. Art. 66(a), U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1988). The redesignation was
only a name change, designed to enhance the stature of the board of review by calling it a court
and calling its members judges. See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 14 (1968).
91. Dettinger v. United States, 7 MJ. 216, 219 (C.M.A. 1979).
92. Art. 66(a), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1958)(amended 1968).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss1/5

12

Brinkley: Military Judges, One Appointment or Two: Weiss v. United States

1994]

MILITARY JUDGES

Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Military
Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each
such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges ....

Appellate military judges who are assigned to a

Court of Military Review may be commissioned officers or civilians,
each of whom must be a member of a bar of a Federal court or of
the highest court of a State .... 93

For the first time, the military had a level of formal appellate review
by a legally trained officer. Furthermore, this was a permanent tribunal as opposed to the temporary courts-martial.94
Nevertheless, the mandate issued to each J.A.G. to establish
Boards of Review was consistent with the traditional practice of vesting authority and responsibility for establishing military tribunals in
military officers and giving them the authority to appoint the members.95 Thus, the redesignation of Boards of Review as Courts of Military Review should be viewed as only a name change. Only
organizational changes were made in the 1968 amendment to improve
efficiency and protect the independence of appellate military judges.96
The name change was accompanied by no new authority, duties, or
appointment procedures for appellate military judges. 97
V.

CONCLUSION

An examination of military judges leads to the conclusion that
their duties and functions are germane to those of military officers

generally. Military judges have no inherent judicial authority. They
gain their judicial authority from the court-martial to which they are
detailed. Until detailed to a specific court-martial by their J.A.G.,
military judges have no more authority than any other military officer
of the same grade or rank. 98
Once detailed, military judges exercise unique and important
functions within the military judicial system. Such functions are not so
distinct from the duties of other military officers to be considered
outside the sphere of a military officer's official duties. It has been
held that the military remains a specialized society separate from civilian society. 99 This also holds true in the area of military justice. In the
93. United States v. Weiss, 36 MJ. 224, 231 (C.M.A. 1992)(emphasis added).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 232-33.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
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military justice system it is not only the military judges that participate; all military officers play a role. The Supreme Court majority in
Weiss highlighted a number of powers and duties within the military
justice system that are exercised by non-judicial military officers. 1°°
Furthermore, the duties now performed by a military judge were
historically performed by non-legal military officers. As the position
of military judge has evolved, the military judge has acquired virtually
all the duties once performed by the President and members of a
court-martial. 10 1 Since judicial duties have always been performed by
military officers, regardless of legal training, and such duties continue
to be shared by all military officers, even if disproportionately, such
duties are germane to the duties of military officers.
Military officers, including military judges, are "officers of the
United States" as contemplated by the Appointments Clause. As
such, they must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause. In Weiss, the Supreme Court properly reached the conclusion
that military judges had been sufficiently appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause when they were appointed as military
officers and did not require a second nomination and appointment
when they were assigned positions as military judges."0 2 However, the
majority improperly concluded the Shoemaker "germaneness" exception did not apply in the present case. In fact, "germaneness" should
be considered whenever it is necessary to assure the conferring of new
duties by Congress does not violate the Appointments Clause. 10 3 The
Court did correctly state in dictum that the duties of military judges
are not so dissimilar or outside the sphere of the duties of military
officers as to require a separate appointment. To hold military judges
to a separate appointment would do little to further the policies of the
Appointments Clause.
P. Dean Brinkley

100. Commissioned officers, for example, have the power and duty to quell quarrels, frays,
and disorders among persons subject to the U.C.MJ. and to apprehend persons subject to the
U.C.MJ. who take part therein. Art. 7(c), U.C.MJ., 10 U.S.C. § 807(c) (1988). Commanding
officers are authorized to impose non judicial punishment which includes restricting a service
member's movement for up to 30 days, suspending the member from duty, forfeiting a week's
pay, and imposing extra duties for up to two consecutive weeks. 10 U.S.C. § 815. Weiss v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 759 (1994).
101. United States v. Weiss, 36 MJ. 224, 228 (C.M.A. 1992).

102. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 760.
103. Id. at 759.
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